The public reason criterion is a prominent theme in contemporary political theory. Yet scholars have focused predominantly on conceptual and normative issues at the expense of empirical questions about the language used by actors engaged in political debate. This is a particular problem in the case of religious actors, whose underlying motives for taking part in such debates are frequently driven by theological concerns. This article explores these issues by analysing religious opposition to the legalisation of assisted dying in Britain. It shows that religious actors have tended towards the use of secular rather than theological modes of argumentation, and that this is consistent with the idea of a strategic shift in response to the increasingly secularised nature of British society.
Introduction
The public reason criterion is a prominent theme in contemporary political theory. Debates centre on the extent to which, in pluralist societies where free citizens hold a variety of incompatible belief systems (or what Rawls (1971) termed 'irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines') actors engaging in political deliberation are morally obliged to adopt a secular form of discourse. Supporters of this criterion claim that comprehensive doctrines such as political ideologies and religious worldviews are fully intelligible only to their adherents, and that the use of public reason fulfils basic principles of justice and legitimacy by ensuring that the laws and policies that citizens are compelled to follow are rendered explicable in terms that all can understand (also see Rawls, 1997) .
Scholars debate the extent to which the criterion should be applied. While Rawls believed that the requirement ought to be limited to fundamental political issues, applicable to legislative decisions, judicial reasoning, the executive branch and candidates for public office (also see Habermas, 2006) , others have taken a different approach. Rorty (2003) , for example, maintained that citizens should not be prohibited from using arguments derived from religious doctrines in public life, but should nevertheless try to limit them as much as possible. Quong (2004) more assertively claims that the use of public reason should be mandated for political deliberation in all arenas where citizens are able to exert political power over each other, and Audi (1993; contends that the criterion should apply to the underlying motivations for a decision as well as the justifications that are subsequently provided (also see Sajo, 2009; Laborde, 2013; Ciszewski, 2016) .
Critics of the public reason criterion raise several objections. One is that the boundary between the public and the private spheres cannot be defined with precision, not least since many agencies and associations (particularly religious groups) operate at the intersection between the two (e.g. Bader, 2009 ). Another claim is that the public reason criterion is reductive, limiting and ultimately contradictory, being unable to provide meaningful answers to social questions without drawing on the kind of religious or metaphysical claims that it rejects. Critics also maintain that excluding religious arguments from public deliberation is illiberal and undemocratic, evinces a clear bias towards anti-religious viewpoints (Kelly and McPherson, 2001; Perry, 2001; Mclure, 2006) and forces religious citizens to act inauthentically, requiring them to set their real motivations aside when engaging in matters of public discourse (see Stepan, 2000; Asad 2003; Connolly 2000; Calhoun, 2008; Wolterstorff, 2010) .
The parameters of these debates are well established, but problematic. One reason for this is that scholars have centred overwhelmingly on the conceptual and normative considerations involved in the use of public reason and have devoted considerably less attention to empirical questions about the kinds of language that actors choose to deploy. This is a particular problem in the case of religious actors, who are frequently involved in matters of public debate, given that their motivation for taking part in such debates are often driven by theological concerns. A small number of studies have highlighted a preference for public reason as opposed to theological arguments on the part of religious actors, suggesting that this may be a form of strategic accommodation to operating in a largely secularised social context (e.g. Hunt, 2007 Hunt, , 2014 Jelen, 2005; Kettell, 2013) . This article contributes directly to this literature by examining the public discourse of religious actors taking part in debates about assisted dying in Britain. This is a timely and revealing subject for analysis. Religious adherence in Britain is in a state of progressive decline but religious actors have been at the forefront of resistance to changing the law in this area.
Strong links exist between higher levels of religiosity and more conservative attitudes towards assisted dying, indicating that religious opposition is driven by theological concerns (Hamil-Luker and Smith, 1998; Burdette et al, 2005; Sikora, 2009; Sharp, 2016; Sharp et al, 2012 Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 1278) as 'a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes and patterns'.
evidence given to official consultations, news reports, speeches and press releases as well as campaign and briefing materials published by the various actors involved.
The analysis confronted several dilemmas. One immediate problem centred on the availability of documentary material. Not all religious groups were equally diligent in maintaining their digital archives, resulting in significant gaps and omissions in the empirical record. Where these were identified, the research was supplemented with the use of the internet archive (The Wayback Machine), 5 through which much of the missing material was subsequently recovered. A second dilemma involved devising a meaningful coding system. The criteria for a 'religious' argument are by no means obvious and the concept of religion is one on which there is no consensus. Audi (1993; maintains that an argument can be considered religious if it meets one or more of the following criteria: overtly referring to divine commands or appeals to scripture, containing premises and/or conclusions that depend on religious considerations, being motivated by a desire to achieve a religious objective or being genetically linked to another argument or proposition that is defined as religious. Following this framework, the study classified an argument as being religious if it was predominantly constructed using religious themes, concepts, assertions, propositions or language. This considered, for example, whether justifications invoked scriptural injunctions (such as the Ten Commandments), divine commands (such as references to 'sin' or God's will) or subtler but still theologically derived references to notions of the 'sacred' or the 'sanctity of life'.
Researchers using content analysis sometimes avoid using preconceived coding structures, preferring to allow the relevant classifications to emerge from the data in an inductive manner (see Herrera and Braumoeller, 2004; Hsieh and Shannon, 2005) . Because this study was interested more in the extent to which religious actors conformed to the public reason criterion than with the minutiae of their discourse, the research took a more directed approach. Being mindful of the risks of producing coding categories that were excessively narrow and fine-grained, the analysis sorted the material according to a threefold system of classification. 
Assisted dying in Scotland
The Scottish debate on assisted dying centred on attempts to secure legalisation through the Scottish Parliament. Position statements were set out during a public consultation on legislative proposals and interested parties were also asked to set out their thoughts in a written submission. 6 The views expressed via these processes were often reported in the Scottish media, feeding into the wider public discussion of these issues (for examples see
Sunday Herald, 2010; Scotsman, 2015; Herald, 2015b) .
According to the website of the Scottish Parliament, a total of twenty-four national religious organisations submitted written evidence opposed to assisted dying. These groups were equally split between the coding categories. Eight groups based their case on overtly theological arguments, eight presented arguments based on qualified theological statements and eight adhered to the public reason criterion. One of the main campaign groups opposed to legalisation, Care Not Killing, was spearheaded by prominent religious figures -Peter Saunders (head of the Christian Medical Fellowship) and Gordon
Macdonald (parliamentary officer for Christian Action Research and Education) -but
presented itself as a non-religious alliance and was not therefore included in the analysis.
The coding of the religious actors engaged in the debate is set out in Table 1 , below. 'Life and the right to life is a gift from God which should only be given and taken by him'), but made no theological claims at all in their more detailed written submission (Evangelical Alliance in Scotland, 2012a Scotland, , 2012b .
In a similar fashion, the Church of Scotland (the single largest religious organisation in the country) deployed a qualified theological argument in its response to the public consultation, referring to 'the absolute sanctity of all human life', but made no theological claims in its written submission (Church of Scotland, 2012a News, 2015) , referring to 'the societal prohibition on the taking of human life' and emphasising that: 'Much of our opposition to assisted-dying legislation is motivated by a concern for the weakest and most vulnerable in our society ' (Scottish Daily Mail, 2015) .
Representatives of the Catholic Church -despite acknowledging the religious underpinnings of their opposition to assisted dying (Herald, 2011) -were also keen to deploy arguments based on public reason, warning, for example, that requests to die might reflect a state of temporary psychological distress (Herald, 2013) , and that legalisation would 'cross a moral boundary that no society should ever breach' (Scotsman, 2010) .
Assisted dying in England and Wales
The public discourse of religious actors in England and Wales followed the dynamics of the Scottish arena, with overtly theological claims being largely downplayed in favour of arguments grounded in public reason. A useful snapshot of opinion here is provided by evidence submitted to a Select Committee inquiry into assisted dying conducted by the
House of Lords in 2004.
A total of twelve national-level religious organisations gave evidence to the inquiry. Of these: three deployed strongly theological arguments, three were classed as qualified theological and six groups adhered to the public reason criterion.
These positions are set out in Table 2 below. As in the Scottish case, groups using theological arguments tended to be smaller and more maintained that life was 'God given' but added that 'to secular people, life is still given' and that the debate was 'not simply a religious versus non-religious issue' (Gill, 2005 were notable for their use of public reason arguments. From a total of 183 press releases on assisted dying between January 2013 (the earliest date available) and the end of January 2018, just 16 (a total of 8.7%) contained theological forms of reasoning. In contrast, public reason arguments were present in a total of 93 press releases (or 50.8% of the total). A high-profile address to the General Synod for example, centred on public reason arguments, claiming that to endorse assisted dying would be 'to enter some very dangerous territory in practical terms', and reserved theological elements for other parts of the address (Williams, 2010 Statements and press comments from James Newcome, the Church of England's lead
Bishop on the issue of health care, were even more notable for their emphasis on public reason arguments. Amongst these was the view that: 'Our concern about this proposed legislation is rooted in our practical care for the most vulnerable in our society' (Huffington Post, 2015; also see Telegraph, 2012a; Times, 2015) . Amongst the key assertions made here included the claim that legalisation had led to the routinisation of the practice, and that public opinion surveys showing support for assisted dying were based on 'hypothetical and abstracted scenarios' and were really a call for better palliative care (Anscombe Bioethics Centre, 2014 .
Contributions from Anglican
This emphasis on public reason was also evident in a range of joint statements issued by vague proposition that: 'our concern is rooted in a profoundly human and profoundly sacred calling to care for the most vulnerable in our society'.
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A strategic shift?
This downplaying of theological claims and an emphasis on arguments grounded in public reason seems to mark a divergence from historical practice. While more research would be required to establish the precise timing and nature of any such change, it is worth observing that it was not uncommon for Christian leaders engaging in debates on this topic (as well as other moral issues) throughout the twentieth century to invoke theological themes (also see Machin, 1998; Kettell, 2018) . the overwhelming weight of Christian tradition over centuries is against both suicide and assisted suicide … This principle … rests upon a conviction of the sanctity of human life … we should move, with the most extreme caution, when we attempt to make an inroad into a principle which has been upheld by the Christian churches and the Christian religion for centuries ' (ibid., 25/3/1969 ' (ibid., 25/3/ , Col. 1242 .
A public discourse drawing on theological justifications was also evident in comments belonging to non-Christian faiths grew from 2% to 7% over the same period the numbers self-identifying with 'no religion' increased from 31% to 53%. These findings are supported by a raft of additional surveys suggesting that secularising trends run across every indicator of religiosity, including membership of religious organisations, attendance at a place of worship, personal beliefs in God and confidence in religious institutions (see Bruce, 2013; Field, 2014; Clements, 2015) .
In such a context an emphasis on public reason arguments may be suggestive of a move towards a form of 'strategic secularism'. This is described by Engelke (2009) as a means by which religious actors seek to promote theological issues and policies by drawing on the tactics (namely: the language, methods and tools) of secular culture. The potential benefits of such an approach are readily apparent, enabling religious actors to widen their appeal beyond the increasingly narrow strata of society that shares their theological views.
As Chaplin (2008: 61-2) , writing for the Christian think-tank, Theos, explains, since '[b] are appeals to a specific religious text or authority will rarely impress', religious groups seeking to persuade public opinion, 'won't lead with their religious convictions if they know this will instantly deprive them of all influence over an important and pressing matter of justice'.
These advantages were recognised by religious actors themselves. The Christian Medical
Fellowship explicitly endorsed the use of public reason arguments, maintaining that, while opposition to assisted dying was derived from a belief 'in the sanctity of human life made in the image of God … to win the debate on assisted dying we need to be using arguments that will make sense to those who do not share our Christian beliefs' (Christian Medical Fellowship, 2006) . The point was also made in guidance contained in a background paper issued by the Church of England. Explicitly highlighting the need for the Church to engage in public debate in a way that avoided theological entanglements, this guidance called for:
An engagement with society on the basis of defensible principles such as the affirmation of life, the care of the vulnerable, the creation of a cohesive and compassionate society and respect for individuals, without requiring agreement on the theological positions that underpin them (McCarthy, 2012) . of abating, and with the potential constituency for overt religious appeals continuing to decline, there seems to be little reason to assume that such an approach would be successful.
Adherence to the public reason criterion might compound the long-term challenges that religious actors face, yet it appears to be their most effective means of shaping public affairs.
Conclusion
Political theorists debating the use of public reason have tended to focus on conceptual and normative principles at the expense of empirical questions about the language used by religious actors. This creates a substantial gap in our understanding of the way in which these actors engage with processes of political deliberation. This study makes a direct contribution to debates in this area by analysing the public discourse of religious actors opposed to the legalisation of assisted dying in Britain. The findings show that while opposition to legalisation has been underpinned by theological motivations, religious actors have largely adhered to the public reason criterion. Overt religious arguments have tended to be the preserve of smaller, more peripheral groups, while larger and more influential bodies have downplayed or ignored theological claims in their public statements.
This discursive pattern is consistent with the notion that religious actors have made a strategic adaptation to the pressures of an increasingly secularised environment. In this case, adherence to the public reason criterion may signify an attempt at maximising their appeal to a wider, non-religious audience. The implications of this development extend beyond debates concerning the use of public reason, engaging themes such as the politicisation of religious identity and the role of religion in the public sphere. Further exploration of these themes could productively be developed in several ways. Comparative analyses of the public and the private language used by religious actors could consolidate claims of strategic adjustment should any substantive differences between the two be found (for example, contrasting the use of secular claims in public with theological messages to members of the group). Comparative studies into the public discourse of religious actors in different national contexts and across a range of public policy issues would also help to draw out the key factors underpinning the deployment of theological and secular claims, as well as their respective consequences. Research into the way that religious actors conceive of strategic change, and the extent to which accommodation to secular norms is seen as an opportunity or a source of external constraint, would deepen our understanding of these issues still further. Answering empirical questions such as these should be the next step for scholars interested in the use of public reason.
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